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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
(1) Does the time an hourly employee spends
participating in an employer-mandated anti-theft search
constitute "work" within the meaning of the Fair Labor
Standards Act?
(2) If such a search occurs at the end of the workday,
is the employee’s time nonetheless non-compensable as
a postliminary activity under the Portal-to-Portal Act?
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REGULATIONS INVOLVED
The regulations involved, in addition to those appended
to the brief for Integrity and the Government, are set out
in an appendix to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Legal Framework
The Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") was enacted
in 1938 and provides that a covered employee who "is
employed for a workweek longer than forty hours" must
be paid for any hours in excess of forty at a rate at least
one and one-half times his or her regular rate. 29 U.S.C.
§ 207(a). "Employ" is defined as "to suffer or permit
to work." 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). The FLSA itself does not
contain a definition of "workweek" or "work."
Congress amended the FLSA in 1947 with passage of
the Portal-to-Portal Act. 61 Stat. 84 (1947). The Portal-to-
Portal Act "narrowed the coverage of the FLSA slightly
by excepting two activities that had been treated as
compensable under [prior Supreme Court] cases: walking
on the employer’s premises to and from the actual place
of performance of the principal activity of the employee,
and activities that are ’preliminary or postliminary’ to
that principal activity." IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21,
27 (2005) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)). As with the FLSA,
the Portal-to-Portal Act itself does not define "work."
The Portal-to-Portal Act left unchanged this Court’s
prior precedent relating to what constitutes "work"
under the FLSA. IBP, 546 U.S. at 28 ("[T]he Portal-to-
Portal Act does not purport to change this Court’s earlier
2descriptions of the terms ’work’ and ’workweek’, or define
the term ’workday.’").
1. The Definition of"Work" Under The FLSA
The first case to address the definition of "work"
under the FLSA was Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co.
v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944).
In Tennessee Coal, this Court held that "work" means
"physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or
not) controlled or required by the employer and pursued
necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer
and his business." Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co., 321 U.S.
at 598; see also Jewel Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167,
United Mine Workers of America, 325 U.S. 161, 164-66
(1945). Subsequently, in Armour & Co. v. Wantock, this
Court made clear that work also includes a period of time
during which an employer directs a worker to be on its
premises, even if the worker is only waiting to engage
in some affirmative exertion. Armour & Co. v. Wantock,
323 U.S. 126, 133 (1944). Thus, under Tennessee Coal and
Armour work is any activity "controlled or required by
the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for
the benefit of the employer and his business."
The Emergence Of The Dichotomy Between
Employer-Required Activities and Practical
Necessities
In Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., this Court
significantly broadened its interpretation of "work."
Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946).
Mt. Clemens expanded the "require[ment]" element of the
Tennessee Coal to encompass two distinct concepts: (1)
activities that are required because they are employer-
directed and (2) activities that are required merely in the
sense that they are a "practical necessity". Mt. Clemens,
328 U.S. at 690-91 ("[T]he statutory workweek includes all
time during which an employee is necessarily required to
be on the employer’s premises .... ") (emphasis added). The
Court held that the time employees spent walking from the
time clocks where they punched in at the factory gate to
the work areas where they made pottery was compensable
work, not because the employer had issued any directive
about how workers were to get from the time clock to
their work stations, but because that internal travel was
a practical necessity. Id. at 691 ("[T]hey walked on the
employer’s premises only because they were compelled
to do so by the necessities of the employer’s business.").
The decision in Mt. Clemens set in motion events that led
to the adoption of the Portal-to-Portal Act.
As the title of the Act makes clear, the primary
concern behind the Portal-to-Portal Act was to address
Mto Clemens’ holding that work under the FLSA includes
the entire period between when an employee enters the
employer’s premises at the beginning of the day and when
the employee exits at the end, even though part of that
time is devoted merely to traveling between the entrance
and the employee’s work station. The Portal-to-Portal
Act provides limited immunity from liability, in pertinent
part, as follows:
[N]o employer shall be subject to any liability
¯.. under the Fair labor Standards Act... on
account of the failure of such employer.., to
pay an employee overtime compensation, for
or on account of any of the following activities
4of such employee engaged in on or after May
14, 1947--
(1) walking, riding, or traveling to and
from the actual place of performance
of the principal activity or activities
which such employee is employed to
perform, and
(2) activities which are preliminary
to or postliminary to said principal
activity or activities,
which occur either prior to the time on any
particular workday at which such employee
commences, or subsequent to the time on any
particular workday at which he ceases, such
principal activity or activities.
29 U.S.C. § 254(a). Section 254(a) consists of two exclusions
(subsections (1) and (2)) which are themselves subject to
a limitation (in the phrase which begins "which occurred
either"). The limiting language that follows subsection (2)
embodies the continuous workday rule. Under that rule,
an employee is entitled to compensation from the first
work of the day until the last work of the day, regardless
of whether during some portion of the period in between
he or she is doing something that in and of itself would not
be considered "work" (e.g., waiting for the next customer,
going to the wash room, or chatting with a co-worker). See
IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 34 (2005). The same rule
applies to walking and waiting that occurs between the
first and last principal activities of workday. "[D]uring a
continuous workday, any walking time that occurs after
5the beginning of the employee’s first principal activity and
before the end of the employee’s last principal activity is
excluded from the scope of [section 254(a) of the Portal-
to-Portal Act], and as a result is covered by the FLSA."
IBP, 546 U.S. at 37; see 29 C.F.R. § 790.6.
The first case to address the meaning of "work" under
the FLSA and the scope of the exclusions in section 254(a)
of the Portal-to-Portal Act was Steiner v. Mitchell, 350
U.S. 247 (1956). Like Mt. Clemens, the activity at issue
in Steiner was not required by an employer-directive;
rather, it was required as a practical necessity. Id. at
250. The workers in Steiner were employed at a battery
manufacturing plant pervaded by dangerous lead and acid,
which would destroy a worker’s clothing and endanger a
worker’s health. Id. at 251. Although many of the workers
in that case chose to change clothes for safety reasons
at the beginning and end of the day at the employer’s
facility, the employer did not require the workers to do
so.1 This Court granted review to decide both whether
the donning and doffing of those work clothes constituted
"work" under the FLSA, and whether it was excluded
from compensation by section 254(a).
Steiner held that the donning and doffing was indeed
work and that this work was outside the scope of the
section 254(a) exclusions. Steiner, 350 U.S. at 255. In doing
so, the Court emphasized that under the circumstances
of the case, wearing non-street clothes on the job, and
thus the donning and doffing thereof, were "integral and
indispensable" to the work of the employees in the plant.
1. See Petitioners’ Brief and Argument on the Merits, No.
22 (O.T. 1955), 4, available at 1955 WL 72535.
6Id. at 252. That "integral and indispensable" analysis
arose out of an activity that was not required by an
employer-directive, but was rather a practical necessity
for the employees. Id. at 252; see also Mitchell v. King
Packing Co., 350 U.S. 260 (1956) (sharpening a knife is a
practical necessity for cutting meat).
More recently, this Court addressed the continuous
workday doctrine and compensable activities under the
FLSA in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez. IBP held that the exceptions
contained in 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) are not applicable after
an employee engages in his or her first principal activity
and prior to the end of that employee’s last principal
activity. IBP, 546 U.S. at 37. The Court reiterated the
rule in Steiner that "any activity that is ’integral and
indispensable’ to a ’principal activity’ is itself a ’principal
activity’ under § 4(a) of the Portal-to-Portal Act." Ibid.
IBP also recognized the singular importance of an
employer directive, noting that certain activities that
would not be compensable if engaged in voluntarily would
be work if ordered by an employer. IBP, 546 at 40, n.8. It
held that although waiting at the beginning of the day to
don protective gear would not by itself be compensable, an
employee would be entitled to compensation if his or her
employer ordered the worker to be on the premises during
that same period of time. Ibid. ("[O]ur analysis would
be different if [the employer] required its employees to
arrive at a particular time in order to begin waiting."). The
Court further held that waiting in line to "doff" the same
clothing at the end of the day was compensable because
of the continuous workday rule, since the doffing was also
a principal activity necessitated by the job. Id. at 22-23.
7B. Early Overtime Claims Based On Employer-
Mandated Searches
Prior to 2009 the only published rulings under the
FLSA and Portal-to-Portal Act regarding searches of
employees were arbitration decisions regarding overtime
claims based on such employer-imposed searches. In
re U.S. Marine Corps Supply Center, held that federal
workers were entitled to overtime payments for a period
of time during which the workers were unable to leave
the parking lot where they worked because government
officials had decided to search every car for an item they
believed had been stolen. In re U.S. Marine Corps Supply
Ctr. and American Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, 1975 Lab.
Arb. LEXIS 308, 65 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 59, "1 (1975) (King,
Arb.). Although the search of each car had taken only
about a minute, there were an "inadequate number of
personnel assigned to accomplish the search." Id. As a
result, the departing workers were delayed as much as
35-minutes. Ibid. In holding that the workers were entitled
to overtime pay, the arbitrator relied on the FLSA, which
had become applicable to federal employees2 as well as the
Labor Department "Hours Worked" regulations. Id. at *9.
The arbitrator rejected the government’s contention that
the search (and related delay) were not work; "[t]he fact
that the[] [employees] performed no physical or mental
labor during that period is not controlling. The employees
2. Citing: "Interim Instructions for Implementing the Fair
Labor Standards Act. Basic Rule: Hours work (sic), in general
include all the time an employee is required to be on duty or on
the Agency’s premises or at a prescribed work place, and all
time during which he is suffered or permitted to work for the
agency." U.S. Marines Corps Supply Ctr., 65 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at
*9 (emphasis in opinion).
were required to remain on the premises of the employer
for its benefit .... "Id. at "10.
In re Curtis Mathes Mfg. Co., construed the FLSA
and Portal-to-Portal Act in a similar fashion. In re Curtis
Mathes Mfg. Co., 1979 Lab. Arb. LEXIS 298; 73 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) LA 103 (1979) (Allen Jr., Arb.), The arbitrator
concluded from a review of other cases "that arbitrators
are persuaded to conclude that security searches and
similar types of delays are compensable if the amount of
time involved is not considered ’de minimis.’" Id. at "12.
Citing the decision in U.S. Marine Corps Supply Ctr., the
arbitrator reasoned that "such delays can be considered
as ’hours worked’ since the employer retains control and
authority over workers." Ibid. The arbitrator rejected
the overtime claim in that case only because it was de
minimis, relying on the fact that the search in question
had occurred on only a single occasion. Id. at "17. The
arbitrator noted that a claim would not be de minimis
if the practice or delay were a regular occurrence of 10
minutes per day. Ibid.; see also, In re Safeway Stores,
Inc., 44 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1193, 1194-95 (1985) (Gentile,
Arb.) (Overtime claim upheld on contractual grounds
arising out of a search that delayed workers’ departure
by 35 minutes.).
C. Proceedings Below
Petitioner Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc.,
("Integrity") provides employees to perform the labor at
many Amazon.corn warehouses nationwide. Pet. App. 3-4,
20; J.A. 18-19. Respondents (and plaintiffs in the District
Court) Busk and Castro ("Plaintiffs") worked for Integrity
as hourly employees in Nevada warehouses, filling orders
placed by Amazon.com customers. Pet. App. 3-4; J.A. 17-
18, 20. At the end of each day, after they had clocked out,
plaintiffs were not permitted to leave the warehouse until
they had been subjected to an anti-theft security search.
J.A. 21-22. During the search process, plaintiffs and
other employees "were required to remove all personal
belongings from their person[s] such as wallets, keys,
and belts, and pass through metal detectors before being
released from work and allowed to leave the facility."
J.A. 22. The screening process required plaintiffs to wait
approximately 25 minutes each day at the end of each shift.
J.A. 21. This time could have easily been reduced to a de
minimis amount through the addition of more security
checkers and/or staggering the quitting time of the shifts,
so that employees could move through the clearance more
quickly. J.A. 27. Plaintiffs commenced this action in federal
district court, asserting that Integrity violated the FLSA
because it did not pay them overtime for the time spent
waiting for and during in the search process. J.A. 23, 24-
28. The complaint asked the court to permit the FLSA
claim to be heard as a collective action on behalf of all
similarly situated Integrity employees nationwide.3
3. First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), ¶ 21. The FLSA
requires individuals who wish to take part in the proceedings to
opt in individually. Pet. App. 5-6. Because this case was dismissed
at the pleadings stage and otherwise stayed during the appeal
process, plaintiffs have been denied the opportunity to send out
court-approved notices of the pendency of the FLSA action as
provided in Hoffman-LaRoche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170
(1989). See Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999)
("Equitable tolling applies when the plaintiff is prevented from
asserting a claim by wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant,
or when extraordinary circumstances beyond the plaintiff’s control
made it impossible to file a claim on time.").
10
The district court dismissed the complaint for failure
to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Pet. App.
19-35. The district court rejected plaintiffs’ contention
that participation in the search itself "was a princip[al]
activity [under the Portal-to-Portal Act] because this
exercise was a daily requirement .... "Pet. App. 27. It held
that plaintiffs were entitled to compensation for the time
consumed by the search only if they could show that it was
"integral and indispensable to their principal activities as
warehouse employees fulfilling online purchase orders."
Id. The district court concluded that the searches were
not integral and indispensable to the warehouse duties
because "[p]laintiffs could perform their warehouse jobs
without such daily security screenings." Pet. App. 28.
The district court opinion suggested that all security
screenings are non-compensable under the FLSA and the
Portal-to-Portal Act. Pet. App. 28 and n.2.
The Ninth Circuit reversed. The Ninth Circuit
rejected "a blanket rule that security clearances are
noncompensable." Pet. App. 13. The court of appeals
correctly utilized the definition of "work" (and "principal
activity") and concluded that the search in this case was
compensable because it was required by the employer (as a
direct employer-mandate) and for the benefit the employer.
Busk and Castro have alleged that Integrity
requires the security screenings, which
must be conducted at work. They also allege
that the screenings are intended to prevent
employee theft--a plausible allegation since
the employees apparently pass through the
clearances only on their way out of work, not
when they enter. As alleged, the security
11
clearances are necessary to employees’ primary
work as warehouse employees and done for
Integrity’s benefit. Assuming, as we must, that
these allegations are true, the plaintiffs have
stated a plausible claim for relief.
Pet. App. 12-13. The Court of Appeals noted that the
complaint alleged that the employer "requires the
screening to prevent employee theft, a concern that stems
from the nature of the employees’ work (specifically,
their access to merchandise)." Pet. App 12. The Ninth
Circuit distinguished the anti-theft screening in this
case from security checks directed at or applied to the
general public. Id.; compare Gorman v. Consol. Edison
Corp., 488 F.3d 586 (2d Cir. 2007) (screening of anyone
entering or leaving a nuclear power plant); Bonilla v.
Baker Concrete Construction Inc., 487 F.3d 1340 (11th
Cir. 2007) (screening to permit only certain workers, but
not the public, to access the tarmac at an airport).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court’s decisions defining what constitutes
"work" under the FLSA encompass two distinct types
of activities: (1) activities that are expressly ordered
by an employer and (2) activities which, although not so
ordered, employees must as a practical matter engage in
because of the non-mandated activity’s connection with
some ordered activity. The "integral and indispensable"
standard in Steiner v. Mitchell, delineates work of the
second type. That standard supplements, rather than
limits, the usual rule that work includes an activity
that is both required by and beneficial to the employer.
Numerous Department of Labor regulations provide that
12
the existence of an employer directive is sufficient (albeit
not necessary) to render an activity "work," even when
that mandated activity is not related to the worker’s other
responsibilities. For example, the regulations provide that
an employer requirement that a worker attend a class or
lecture is work even if the subject matter involved "is not
directly related to the employee’s job." 29 C.F.R. § 785.27.
Steiner does not mean, as Integrity and the Government
appear to contend, that employer-required pre- and post-
shift activity is not compensable unless the employer has
ordered the worker to do something that is directly or
closely related to that worker’s shift work. If an employer
requires a worker to engage in pre- or post- shift activity
for the benefit of the employer, that activity is work within
the scope of the FLSA, even if it is wholly unrelated
to the employee’s shift work. Under the interpretation
of the law advanced by Integrity and the Government,
Integrity could require warehouse workers, prior to or
after their paid shift, to engage without compensation in
any mandatory work activity that was not closely related
to filling Amazon.corn customer orders, such as mowing
the lawn in front of the warehouse or washing the bosses
car. The statute and regulations clearly do not permit an
employer to require uncompensated, "off-the-clock" work
so long as it is not essential to a worker’s paid activity.
The activity at issue in this case easily falls within
the definition of work under the FLSA. The complaint
alleges that workers are required, prior to leaving the
warehouse, to take part in a search of their persons. That
search, intended to detect and deter theft of property,
obviously benefitted the employer. J.A. 22. If a worker
were required to come into the warehouse on his or her day
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off to take part in a search--such as a search of his or her
locker, cell phone or person--that activity would constitute
work. Just like the lawn mowing by a warehouse worker
after the end of a shift, the search becomes a part of that
employee’s job, and therefore, a principal activity per se,
and is compensable. 29 C.F.R. § 790.8 ("The ’principal
activities’ referred to in the statute are activities which
the employee is ’employed to perform’").
The Department of Labor’s regulations provide
that checking in and checking out, under ordinary
circumstances, are preliminary or postliminary activities.
But being searched is obviously different from checking in
and out. Checking in and out is an activity that identifies
for the employer which specific workers have entered or
left the premises or work area, and usually makes a record
of the time at which they did so. A search does neither of
those things; a guard or other searcher typically would
not ask for employee identification at the time of the
search or make a record of who was searched or when.
The employer does not even care about the identity of the
worker searched unless there is a problem. Moreover, an
activity that would otherwise constitute work does not
become postliminary merely because it occurs at the end
of the day. Under the regulations and well-established
precedent, turning in reports, clothes, or equipment
are common end-of-day activities that constitute work
and principal activities; those activities do not become
non-compensable simply because they are moved to a
location near an exit. 29 C.F.R. § 790.8 ("The legislative
history further indicates that Congress intended the
words "principal activities" to be construed liberally
... to include any work of consequence performed for an
employer, no matter when the work is performed.").
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Most searches and security screenings do not give
rise to claims under the FLSA. In most circumstances,
the time involved in connection with a search would be
so brief as to be de minimis. See 29 C.F.R. § 785.47. In
the instant case, Integrity could in any number of ways
render de minimis the search and any related delays.
Furthermore, many searches or screenings apply to and
may be directed primarily at members of the general
public entering or exiting a building; in that circumstance,
the agency or company imposing that condition on entry
onto its property would be acting as the proprietor of the
facility, not as an employer.
ARGUMENT
The compensability of a particular activity under
the FLSA turns on two distinct questions: whether it
constitutes "work" within the meaning of the FLSA,
and whether a claim for compensation for that "work" is
precluded by section 254(a) of the Portal-to-Portal Act.
Although the instant litigation concerns a post-shift
search, it turns on a more fundamental and far reaching
dispute about the general legal standards governing the
compensability of pre- and post-shift4 activities. The
briefs for Integrity and the Government suggest, for
example, that employer-mandated pre- and post-shift
activities are only compensable if the activity in question
is integral and indispensable to the primary shift duty of
an employee. Such an interpretation of the FLSA would
permit employers to impose countless unpaid tasks on
4. Plaintiffs use the term "shift" to refer to the period of
time for which an employer is paying a worker.
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their workers. A receptionist could be required to come in
early and make coffee without pay. A computer technician
could be ordered to stay late to wash the windows without
compensation. The arguments advanced in this case are
replete with such broader implications.
Participation In An Employer-Mandated Search
For Stolen Merchandise Is Work Under The FLSA
Because It Is Done At The Direction Of And For
The Benefit Of The Employer
A. An Activity Required by and Benefitting the
Employer Constitutes Work Under the FLSA
Any activity "controlled or required by the employer
and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit
of the employer and his business" is "work" under the
FLSA. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local
No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944); Armour & Co. v.
Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133 (1944). Both the Department
of Labor regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 785.7~, and virtually
5. Section 785.7 provides:
The United States Supreme Court originally stated
that employees subject to the act must be paid for all
time spent in "physical or mental exertion (whether
burdensome or not) controlled or required by the
employer and pursued necessarily and primarily
for the benefit of the employer and his business."
(Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. Muscoda
Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590 (1944) .... The Portal-to-
Portal Act did not change the rule except to provide an
exception for preliminary and postliminary activities.
See 29 C.F.R. § 551.104 ("Hours of work means all time spent by
an employee performing an activity for the benefit of an agency
and under the control or direction of the agency.")
16
every court of appeals6 continue to utilize that definition.
See 1 Ellen Kearns, ed., The Fair Labor Standards Act
(2d ed. 2010), 8-11 ("The proper inquiry as to whether
activities constitute ’work’ is .... whether it is ’controlled
or required by the employer and pursued for the benefit
of the employer.’") (quoting Tennessee Coal).
An activity is "work" within the meaning of the FLSA
even if an employer directs an employee to do nothing
other than to be on its premises. "[A]n employer, if he
chooses, may hire a man to do nothing, or to do nothing
but wait for something to happen ..... Readiness to serve
may be hired, quite as much as service itself .... [I]nactive
duty may be duty nonetheless .... " Armour & Co. v.
Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133 (1945); Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U.S. 134,136-37 (1944). The employer inArmour
had cited Tennessee Coal’s passage describing "work" as
"physical or mental exertion" required by an employer;
the company argued that merely waiting for something to
do involved no such exertion. In rejecting that contention,
the Court emphasized that the definition in Tennessee Coal
was intended only to explain why the circumstances of that
6. See e.g., Manning v. Boston Medical Center, 775 F.3d 34,
46 (1st Cir. 2013); Singh v. City of New York, 524 F.3d 361, 367
(2d Cir. 2008)(opinion by Sotomayor, J.); De Ascencio v. Tyson
Foods, Inc., 500 F.3d 361,365 (3d Cir. 2007); Perez v. Mountaire
Farms, Inc., 650 F.3d 350, 363 (4th Cir. 2011); Von Friewalde v.
Boeing Aerospace Operations, 339 Fed.Appx. 448, 453 n.3 (5th Cir.
2009); Chao v. Tradesmen Int’l, Inc., 310 F.3d 904, 907 (6th Cir.
2002); Sehie v. City of Aurora, 432 F.3d 749, 751 (7th Cir. 2005);
Blair v. Wills, 420 F.3d 823, 829 (8th Cir. 2005); Alvarez v. IBP,
Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2003), aff’d sub nora. IBP, Inc. v.
Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005); United Transp. Union Local 1745 v.
Albuquerque, 178 F.3d 1109, 1117 (10th Cir. 1999); Leone v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 523 F.3d 1153, 1162 (D.C.Cir. 1975).
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particular case constituted work, and not to establish an
exclusive definition limiting the scope of the FLSA with
regard to other dissimilar circumstances. Armour, 323
U.S. at 133.
In Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., this Court
adopted the more far reaching holding that an employee
is entitled to compensation for the entire time he or she
needs to be on the employer’s premises, even for the period
when the worker is walking between the factory gate and
his or her workstation. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery
Co., 328 U.S. 680, 691 (1946). Congress enacted the Portal-
to-Portal Act in response. Sandifer v. United States Steel
Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870, 875 (2014); IBP, 546 U.S. at 27.7
The Portal-to-Portal Act did not establish a new
definition of "work"; rather, it only limited in two
specific ways the application of the existing definition.
Absent a contract or custom to the contrary, section
254(a) precludes employer liability for claims based on
certain travel (section 254(a)(1)) or for "preliminary" or
"postliminary" activity (sections 254(a)(2)). See IBP, 546
7. This case is concerned with the narrow prospective
provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 254 rather than the broad retrospective
general amnesty provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 252, which shows that
if Congress wanted to grant broad relief, it could easily have
done so. See Brief for the Secretary of Labor, Steiner v. Mitchell,
10-11 ("[A] sharp distinction must be drawn between the broad
exclusionary standard adopted in relation to suits for back pay
for alleged pre-Portal-to-Portal Act violations (Sec. 2) and the
discrete, more liberal set of criteria governing future (i.e., post-
enactment rights of compensation) (Sec. 4) .... Congress, in
dealing with the declared ’existing emergency,’ did not propose to
alter drastically or permanently the future operation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.").
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U.S. at 28 ("Other than its express exceptions for travel to
and from the location of the employee’s ’principal activity,’
and for activities that are preliminary or postliminary
to that principal activity, the Portal-to-Portal Act does
not purport to change this Court’s earlier descriptions of
the terms ’work,’ and ’workweek,’ or to define the term
’workday.’") "[T]he [Portal-to-Portal] Act preserved
potential liability for working time not made compensable
by contract or custom but narrowed the coverage of the
FLSA by excepting two activities that had been treated as
compensable under our cases: walking on the employer’s
premises to and from the actual place of performance
of the principal activity of the employee, and activities
that are ’preliminary or postliminary’ to that principal
activity.’’8 Any activity which is a "principal activity"
remains compensable under section 254(a).
Steiner v. Mitchell, interpreted both the meaning of
work under the FLSA and the scope of the exclusions in
section 254(a) of the Portal-to-Portal Act. Steiner, 350 U.S.
at 255. Steiner concerned the compensability of activities
that were required as a practical necessity to perform
a particular job, as distinct from activities that were
required by an employer-directive. Id. at 252-53. Steiner
held that an activity that is not required by an employer-
directive would nonetheless constitute work if it is integral
8. The Government endorses this view. "[T]he Portal-to-
Portal Act left unchanged the ’Court’s earlier descriptions of
the terms "work" and "workweek," though it added ’express
exceptions for travel to and from the location of the employee’s
"principal activity," and for activities that are preliminary or
postliminary to that principal activity.’ IBP, 546 U.S. at 28."
U.S. Br. 3-4. The Department of Labor regulations adopted that
interpretation of section 254(a) several decades before this Court’s
decision in IBP. See 29 C.F.R. § 785.7.
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and indispensable to the worker’s formal assignment.s. Id.
at 252. The workers in that case were not required by the
employer to change clothes before and after their shift
and some did not.9 This Court endorsed the lower court’s
conclusion that even though (or if) the activities were not
required by an employer-directive, the activities were
nonetheless required as a practical necessity because
changing clothes was integral and indispensable to the
employees’ work manufacturing batteries. Id. at 256.
As a result, changing clothes was both work (and thus
compensable under the FLSA) and a principal activity
under the Portal-to-Portal Act (thus outside the scope of
the section 254(a) exclusions).
The trial court held that these activities "are
made necessary by the nature of the work
performed".., that they "directly benefit [the
employer] in the operation of their business,
and that they "are so closely related to other
duties performed by [the] employee as to be
an integral part thereof and are, therefore,
included among the principal activities of said
employees."
350 U.S. at 2531°; see also Mitchell v. King Packing
Co., 350 U.S. 260, 263 (1956) (applying integral and
9. See Durkin v. Steiner, 111 F. Supp. 546, 548 (M.D.Tenn.
1953) ("there are some employees who did not change clothes");
Steiner v. Mitchell, 215 F.2d 171, 172 (6th Cir. 1954) ("most...
employees" change clothes).
10. Both the district court and the court of appeals had
held that changing clothes was so necessary to the work of the
employees as to be part of those duties. Steiner v. Mitchell, 215
F.3d at 172; Durkin v. Steiner, 111 F. Supp. at 547-48.
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indispensable standard to knife sharpening that was
practically necessary for an employee’s work). Steiner
supplemented, but it did not displace, the definition of work
in Tennessee Coal. Work under the FLSA includes both
activities that are "an integral part" of a worker’s assigned
duties (thought not expressly assigned by the employer),
as well as all expressly assigned duties themselves.11 The
characterization of an activity does not change merely
because the activity occurs at the end of the shift.
This Court more recently addressed the scope of
"work" and the Portal-to-Portal Act in IBP, Inc., 546
U.S. at 12. IBP made clear that that the term "principal
activities" refers to activities, other than those excluded
by sections 254(a)(1) and 254(a)(2), which would constitute
"work" under the FLSA. IBP, 546 U.S. at 27-28. IBP holds
that the exclusions in section 254(a)(1) and 254(a)(2) are
the only "exceptions" created by the Portal-to-Portal Act
to the Court’s prior definitions of "work" and "workweek."
Id. at 28. The phrase "principal activity or activities" thus
does not contain some tacit third limitation on what is work
under the FLSA.’’12 Thus, a "principal activity" is "work"
11. A number of the lower courts have fashioned hybrid
standards for compensability that in various ways combine
elements of the analytically distinct Tennessee Coal and Steiner
tests, although the ultimate conclusions in those cases are not
necessarily incorrect under the more complete analysis presented
here.
12. "Principal activities" necessarily does not include either
section 254(a)(1) travel and section 254(a)(2) preliminary and
postliminary activity, because otherwise section 254(a) would
be meaningless. Section 254(a)(1) travel or section 254(a)(2)
preliminary or postliminary activities could not occur "prior to"
or "after" the first and last "principal activities" of the workday
if they were themselves principal activities.
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other than the activities specifically excluded by sections
254(a)(1) and 254(a)(2).13
B. Participation In The Search In This Case Was
Work Under the FLSA
The complaint in this case clearly alleges circumstances
that constitute work under Tennessee Coal. The First
Amended Collective and Class Action Complaint ("FAC")
asserts that the plaintiffs were "required to go through a
security search before leaving the facilities at the end of
the day," "required to wait in line in order to be searched,"
and "required to remove all personal belongings from
their person.., and pass through metal detectors before
being released from work and allowed to leave the facility."
FAC ¶¶ 15-17; J.A. 21-22. The complaint in this case
repeatedly alleges that the employer commanded the
employees to wait and then undergo the exit search and
bag check for stolen inventory. Id. The task of waiting in
line and then undergoing a screening at the end of the
day was specifically required by the employer. J.A. 19,
21. An Integrity employee could not leave the warehouse
unless he or she stood on line and waited to be searched
by order of the employer. J.A. 19, 21-22. The complaint
also alleges that these requirements benefited Integrity,
13. Integrity insists that in adopting the Portal-to-Portal Act
"Congress swiftly and emphatically rejected th[e] approach" in the
Tennessee Coal definition of work. Pet. Br. 21 (quoting Tennessee
Coal); see Pet. Br. 35 ("[t]he express purpose of the Portal-to-
Portal Act was to overthrow the ancient regime"). But IBP makes
clear, and the Government agrees, the Portal-to-Portal Act had
a far more limited effect, excluding only the specific activities
delineated in section 254(a)(1) and 254(a)(2), and leaving otherwise
intact the Tennessee Coal definition.
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which the Ninth Circuit considered a plausible allegation
supported by the fact that the search was conducted only
upon exiting. FAC ¶ 11; J.A. 19, 21.
If an employer were to require a worker to come
into the plant or office on his or her day off, and spend
25 minutes participating in a search (or waiting to be
searched), there would be no serious question that the
activity constituted work for which compensation was
required. That would be true whether the work consisted
of going through the worker’s locker or purse, rummaging
through the worker’s cell phone, providing a blood or
urine test, or--as here--searching the workers and thier
bags. The Government acknowledges that at least some
employer-imposed searches are compensable, but does
not propose a rule to distinguish them from assertedly
non-compensable searches. U.S. Br. 31 n.18.
II. Because Integrity Mandated Participation In This
Search, It Is Not A Postliminary Activity Under The
Portal-to-Portal Act
The employer-mandated search in this case was a
principal activity, and thus compensable. "The legislative
history.., indicates that Congress intended the words
’principal activities’ to be liberally construed.., to include
any work of consequence performed for an employer, no
matter when the work is performed." 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(a).14
As a number of circuits have repeatedly recognized, to be
14. The Government acknowledges the correctness of that
regulation. U.S. Br. 21 ("As the regulations indicate, ’Congress
intended the words ’principal activities’ to be construed liberally
... to include any work of consequence performed for an employer,
no matter when the work is performed.’" 29 C.F.R. 790.8(a).").
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excluded by section 254(a), activities "must be undertaken
’for the employees’ own convenience, not being required by
the employer and not being necessary for the performance
of their duties for the employer." Dunlop v. City Electric,
Inc., 537 F.3d 394, 398 (5th Cir. 1976) (citing Mitchell v.
Southeastern Carbon Paper Co., 228 F.2d 934 at 939 (5th
Cir. 1955)).15 If the search itself was a principal activity,
the waiting period that preceded the search, is also
compensable under the continuous workday rule because
the final principal activity of the day--the search--had
not yet been completed. Waiting to be searched at the end
of the day is like waiting in line to doff required clothing
or safety equipment in IBP.
Section 254(a) Does Not Limit Compensability
To Activities That Meet The Steiner "Integral
and Indispensable" Standard
Integrity argues that pre- and post-shift work is a
non-compensable preliminary or postliminary activity
under section 254(a) unless an employee can affirmatively
demonstrate that the Steiner"integral and indispensable"
standard is met. This is true only for activities that are
not mandated by the employer; absent such an employer
directive, an activity would only be work (and thus a
principal activity) if it were necessary as a practical matter
for the worker to perform the assigned tasks. Steiner,
IBP, the text of section 254(a), and the Department of
Labor’s regulations each make clear that an activity which
is required by an employer-mandate need not also satisfy
the "integral and indispensable" standard.
15. See Kellarv. Summit Seating, Inc., 664 F.3d 169, 175 (7th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Dunlop); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight
System, Inc., 750 F.2d 47, 50 (8th Cir. 1984) (quoting Dunlop).
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(1) In Steiner the integral and indispensable standard
was merely one method of establishing that an activity
was a principal activity and thus outside the section
254(a) exclusions, not the exclusive method for doing
so.TM Steiner held that "the term ’principal activity or
activities’ in Section [254] embraces all activities which
are an ’integral and indispensable part of the principal
activities[]’ .... " Steiner, 350 U.S. at 252-53 (emphasis
added, footnote omitted). In Steiner, the term "embraces"
means "includes," not "is limited to." Ibid. The purpose
of Steiner was to address a situation in which an activity
(changing clothes) had not been mandated by an employer,
but was nonetheless a task-specific practical necessity;
the Court in Steiner assuredly did not mean to hold that
employer-directed tasks are non-compensable unless
integral and indispensable to something else.
(2) Second, Integrity’s insistence that pre- and post-
shift work is noncompensable unless it (in some fashion)
satisfies the "integral and indispensable" standard is
inconsistent with the holding in IBP regarding compulsory
waiting time. One question in IBP was whether the
employees were entitled to compensation for time they
spent at the beginning of the day waiting to don certain
specialized clothing; the donning itself was held to be
"integral and indispensable," and hence, itself a principal
16. Integrity repeatedly insists that in Steiner "this Court
has held that an activity is compensable only if it is an ’integral
and indispensable part of the principal activities for which covered
workmen are employed.’ Steiner, 350 U.S. at 256." Pet. Br. 22
(emphasis added). That assertion, in each instance with the key
word "only" inserted before the quotation from Steiner, is repeated
essentially verbatim four other times in Integrity’s brief. Pet. Br.
2, 10, 16, 36. Steiner never uses the word "only" in this context.
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activity. IBP held that such pre-donning waiting was
noncompensable under section 254(a) if the employer only
required the workers to be wearing that clothing when
work started, and the waiting occurred simply because
there was a line to pick up clothing. IBP, 546 U.S. at 40-42.
This Court made clear, however, that the waiting
period would have been compensable if the employer had
ordered the workers to be on its premises during that
(or any other) period. "[O]ur analysis would be different
if [the employer] required its employees to arrive at a
particular time in order to begin waiting." Id. at 40 n.8.
IBP recognized that if the employer had "required its
workers to report to the changing area at a specific time",
29 C.F.R. § 790.7(h) would be applicable.17
17. 29 C.F.R. § 790.7(h) states that when an employee is
required by his employer to report at a particular hour at his
workbench or other place where he performs his principal activity,
if the employee is there at that hour ready and willing to work
but for some reason beyond his control there is no work for him to
perform until some time has elapsed, waiting for work would be an
integral part of the employee’s principal activities. Id. at 41. The
difference in the two situations is that in the second the employee
was engaged to wait while in the first the employee waited to be
engaged.(Footnote omitted).
29 C.F.R. § 553.221 states:
Compensable hours of work generally include all of
the time during which an employee is on duty on the
employer’s premises or at a prescribed workplace, as
well as all other time during which the employee is
suffered or permitted to work for the employer. Such
time includes all pre-shift and post-shift activities
which are an integral part of the employee’s principal
activity or which are closely related to the performance
of the principal activity, such as attending roll call,
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An employer-mandated arrival and resulting waiting
period would not by itself be integral and indispensable to
anything; yet under IBP and the governing regulation an
employer must compensate a worker who arrives at such
a mandated time, even if the employee has nothing to do.
The same logic applies to an employer mandate that the
employee remain later than the end of the shift, regardless
of the employer’s purpose in having the employee stay
late. If an employer only paid workers until 5:00 p.m.,
but directed the workers to stay on its premises doing
nothing for another hour, that additional one hour period
would be compensable even though it was not integral
and indispensable to any activity. And if the employer
told the employees to stay on the premises another 25
minutes after the shift was over so that the employees
could complete another primary activity, the waiting time
would assuredly be compensable.
(3) None of the various standards proposed by
Integrity and the Government are consistent with the
text of section 254(a). Integrity contends that "this Court
has held than an activity is compensable only if it is an
’integral and indispensable part of the principal activities
for which covered workmen are employed.’ Steiner, 350
U.S. at 256." Pet. Br. 22 (emphasis in original). But the
limitation "only" does not appear in Steiner itself.TM This
writing up and completing tickets or reports, and
washing and re-racking fire hoses.
18. Similarly, the Government asserts that in IBP "the Court
reiterated that the touchstone for determining whether an activity
is compensable under Section 254(a) is whether it ’is "integral
and indispensable" to a "principal activity." IBP, 546 U.S. at 37."
U.S. Br. 4. This characterization of IBP is inconsistent with the
holding in that case that workers would have been entitled to
27
proposed standard would exclude activities that are
themselves principal activities, but not a "part" of some
other principal activity. Elsewhere Integrity asserts that
"an activity is compensable under the FLSA only if it is so
integral and indispensable to the employee’s other primary
activities that it too counts as part of those primary
activities." Pet. Br. 2 (emphasis added). But compensable
pre-and post-shift principal activity under section 254(a)
is not limited to a principal activity that is integral and
indispensable to some "other" principal activity. If that
were the rule, an employee would have to have at least
two principal activities to be entitled to compensation;
but section 254(a) provides for compensability of the
"principal activity"--singular--as well as in a case of
multiple "principal activities." Other formulas proposed
by Integrity would limit "principal activity or activities"
to work an employee does during his or her paid shift;
pre- and post- shift work could not by itself be a principal
activity, and thus could be compensable only if integral and
indispensable to some shift work. If that were the case,
the use of the phrase "principal activity or activities" in
section 254(a) would constitute an additional limitation on
what constitutes compensable work, and would exclude
any work for which the employer simply refuses to pay.
IBP held, however, that the only limitations in section
254(a) on what constitutes compensable work are those
in subsections 254(a)(1) (certain travel) and 254(a)(2)
(preliminary and postliminary activities). IBP, 546 U.S.
at 40w41.19
compensation if the employer had required them to be at work at
a certain time, regardless of whether they were performing any
job duties at that time.
19. In 1996 Congress passed the Employee Commuting
Flexibility Act ("ECFA") amendment to the Portal-to-Portal
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(4) Department of Labor regulations have for decades
provided that when an employer directs a worker to
do something, the employer must pay the employee for
the time spent engaging in that activity, regardless of
whether the employer-mandated activity is integral and
indispensable to the employee’s other job responsibilities.
The regulations regarding the Portal-to-Portal Act
specifically address a situation in which an employee is
required by his or her employer to engage in activities
that are not integral and indispensable to his own work:
In the case of a garment worker in a textile
mill, who is required to report 30 minutes
before other employees report to commence
their principal activities, and who during such
Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 254(a), to provide that merely driving a
company car to and from work, or incidental activities such as
filling the car with gas, are not compensable, so long the drive was
within normal commuting distance and as long as the worker (or
his or her union) has agreed to that arrangement. This amendment
clearly assumes that under prior law, a worker would be entitled
to compensation if he or she were ordered to drive the company
vehicle to and from work, at least absent some union agreement.
The ECFA states:
For the purposes of this subsection, the use of an
employer’s vehicle for travel by an employee and
activities performed by an employee which are
incidental to the use of such vehicle for commuting
shall not be considered part of the employee’s principal
activities if the use of such vehicle for travel is within
the normal commuting area for the employer’s business
or establishment and the use of the employer’s vehicle
is subject to an agreement on the part of the employer
and the employee or representative of such employee.
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30 minutes distributes clothing or parts of
clothing at the work benches of other employees
and gets machines in readiness for operation by
other employees, such activities are among the
principal activities of such employee.
Such preparatory activities, which the
Administrator has always regarded as work
and as compensable under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, remain so under the Portal
Act ....
29 C.F.R. § 790.5(b) (emphasis added).2° Although there
might be some situations in which assisting other workers
would affect an employee’s own shift work (such as where
the other employees prepare garments on which that
employee in question later works), this regulation is not
limited to (and, indeed, does not refer to) such cases.
Nor would it matter if the employee who passed out
the garments was a garment worker or a receptionist
or a bookkeeper. The time is compensable because the
employer required the employee to perform that task.
The Department of Labor regulations clearly require
compensation for time spent on activities that are not
integral and indispensable to the worker’s duties during
the "regular shift." The regulations provide that donning
and doffing employer-required uniforms on employer
premises is compensable, regardless of whether the
20. This situation in which a worker engages in pre-shift
activity to assist other workers was referred to in the Senate
Report and in the Senate debates. S. Rep. No. 48, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 48; 93 Cong. Rec. 2298 (remarks of Sen. McGrath and Sen
Cooper), 2350 (remarks of Sen. Barkley and Sen. Cooper).
30
uniforms are needed to do the job. "[C]lothes-changing
¯.. must be counted as hours worked if the changing of
clothes.., is indispensable to the performance of the
employee’s work or is required by law or by the rules of
the employer." 29 C.F.R. § 785.26 (emphasis added).21
Donning and doffing an employer-required uniform on the
employers premises is compensable even if the uniform
itself is not indispensable to whatever the employee does
while wearing it.2~ If Integrity were to require warehouse
workers to wear uniforms and don and doffthose uniforms
at the warehouse facility, that obviously would not be
essential to filling orders from Amazon.com customers,
yet the regulations clearly would require Integrity to pay
for the time needed to put on and take off the uniforms,
and indeed for waiting and walking time prior to removing
the uniform.~3
21. Similarly, 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(c) provides that clothes
changing is compensable under section 254(a) if it is "required
by law, by rules of the employer, or by the nature of the work."
In discussing the Portal-to-Portal Act, Senator Cooper contrasts
clothes changing required by the nature of a job with clothes
changing that is "merely a convenience to the employee." 93 Cong.
Rec. at 2298.
22. Integrity insists that "changing clothes would be
compensable only ’if the employee could not perform his [principal]
activity’ without it." Pet. Br. 9 (quoting 93 Cong. Rec. 2297-98
(1947) (remarks of Sen. Cooper). The regulations expressly provide
otherwise.
23. The Government also asserts that clothes changing which
is required by an employer would not be compensable if the clothes
lacked "a close or direct relationship to the actual performance of
the employee’s productive work." U.S. Br. 19. In that situation, the
clothes changing would be noncompensable, in the United States’
view, because it would be "indispensable" (i.e., mandated by the
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29 C.F.R. § 790.6(b) provides that "[i]f an employee is
required to report at the actual place of performance of his
principal activity at a certain specific time, his ’workday’
commences at the time he report there for work in
accordance with the employer’s requirement, even though
through a cause beyond the employee’s control, he is not
able to commence performance of his productive activities
until a later time." That regulation includes situations in
which for some reason (such as a shortage of supplies) the
worker will have nothing to do, but some official forgot to
tell the employees not to come in that day; such inactivity
would not "integral and indispensable" to anything. 24
The regulations also require compensation for
"[t]ime spent in work for public or charitable purposes at
the employer’s request, or under his direction or control."
Participation in such charitable activities would not be
integral and indispensable to the work of any employees
except perhaps those who work in a company’s community
relations department. 29 C.F.R. § 785.44. The regulations
regarding time spent on employee suggestions provides
that such activity is compensable if an employee "is
assigned" to do so. See 29 C.F.R. § 785.45.25 An employee
employer) but not "integral." Id. The very regulation which the
Government cites, however, states specifically that such employer-
mandated clothes changing would be integral and compensable.
29 C.F.R. § 790.8(c) and n.65.
24. There are some positions, such as a firefighter, in which
waiting to be called into action is a central part of the job. But
section 790(6)(b) is not limited to such situations.
25. "Generally, time spent by employees outside of their
regular working hours in developing suggestions under a general
suggestion system is not working time, but if employees are
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might be assigned to work on a suggestion that was not
essential to his or her own tasks. Employer-required
attendance at a lecture or training program counts as work
time even if that lecture or training "is not directly related
to the employee’s job." 29 C.F.R. § 785.27. Integrity would
be obligated to compensate its employees if it directed
them, after the end of their shift, to attend a lecture on a
topic wholly unrelated to their jobs as warehouse workers.
The Department of Labor’s Field Operations
Handbook provides that the Wage Hour Division will
not consider as hours worked time spent on a company
sports team, but only "if the participation of the employee
in these activities is completely voluntary and if his/her
regular employment is not conditioned upon participating
in these activities." Field Operations Handbook section
31b05 (2000). If Integrity required its workers to play
on a company softball team, Integrity would have to
compensate the workers for the time involved, even
though those sporting events would be neither integral
nor indispensable to the regular duties of the employees
in question.
All of these regulations concern activities that occur
before a worker’s paid shift begins or after that shift has
ended; if the activities occurred in between, they would
be compensable anyway under the continuous workday
rule. If Integrity ordered Plaintiffs in this case to engage
in any of those activities after they clocked out, the
permitted to work on suggestions during regular working hours
the time spent must be counted as hours worked. Where an
employee is assigned to work on the development of a suggestion,
the time is considered time worked."
33
regulations would clearly have required compensation,
even though the activities would obviously not have been
integral and indispensable to filling Amazon.corn orders.
Yet both Integrity and the Government insist that the
time spent waiting to be searched and the time spent
being searched pursuant to an employer-directive are
not compensable if they occur after the shift ends. It is
difficult to understand how the position taken in pages 10
to 22 of the Government’s brief (other than footnote 6) can
be reconciled with these Labor Department regulations.
This Search Is Neither Walking Under Section
254(a)(1) Nor Preliminary and Postliminary
Activity Under Section 254(a)(2)
Section 254(a)(1) precludes FLSA claims for time spent
"walking... to and from the actual place of performance
of the principal activity or activities." Section 254(a)(2)
bars such claims for "activities which are preliminary to
or postliminary to said principal activity or activities." The
regulations regarding section 254(a)(2) delineate two types
of activities that would be preliminary or postliminary:
First, activities undertaken by a worker for his personal
convenience, 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(c), and second, activities
related to the compensation process, such as checking in
and out or waiting in line to receive pay checks. 29 C.F.R.
§ 790.7(g). Neither section 254(a)(1) nor section 254(a)(2)
apply to the search in this case.
(1) Integrity suggests that participation in the search
(and the related waiting) is rendered noncompensable
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by section 254(a)(1), which bars compensation claims for
"walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place
of performance of the principal activity or activities,"
unless that travel occurs during the continuous workday.2~
Integrity asserts that inching forward in a long waiting
line, and stepping through a metal detector, constitute
"walking" within the exclusion of section 254(a)(1). A
25-minute period during which an employee moves a few
yards would more apt!y be described as standing in line,
waiting, rather than walking to the exit. The target of
the employee’s slow shuffle is not the exit, but the metal
detector used to search the employee.
In any event, as with waiting, the compensability of
walking (if the circumstances of this case could fairly be
described as "walking") depends on what an employee
is walking to and from. Walking to a time clock is not
compensable. But IBP held that time walking between
a work station and the place where an employee doffs
protective gear is compensable.27 IBP, 546 U.S. at 33-
40. And the regulations make clear that section 254(a)
(1) does not preclude compensation if an employee was
26. "Waiting in line for a security screening is indistinguishable
from many other tasks that have been found non-compensable
under the FLSA, such as... walking from the parking lot to the
workplace .... See 29 C.F.R. § 790.7(f)-(g) .... Indeed, time spent
waiting to clear security is indistinguishable from time spent
walking between the time clock and the work station that was..
¯ squarely addressed in the Portal-to-Portal Act." Pet. Br. 16-17.
27. Integrity’s argument that "a reasonable amount of
waiting time" at the beginning or end of the day is always
noncompensable is incorrect. Pet. Br. 26. Waiting that occurs
prior to the last principal activity is compensable no matter how
reasonable the length of time involved.
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required to engage in some work activity while traveling.
"An employee who walks, rides or otherwise travels while
performing active duties is not engaged in the activities
described in section [254(a)]." 29 C.F.R. § 790.7(d). "Any
work which an employee is required to perform while
traveling must, of course, be counted as hours worked."
29 C.F.R. § 785.41. An employee who after leaving his or
her main work area "transport[s] equipment to a central
location" U.S. Br. 31-32 n.18, would be necessarily be
traveling; yet, as the government correctly observes, that
activity would be compensable. Stepping through a metal
detector (and waiting to do so) is not "indistinguishable"
from walking to a time clock merely because both
activities involve walking, any more than on it would be
indistinguishable from walking to a guard station to turn
in equipment or a report. The mere fact that the activity
in this case arguably involved walking does not establish
that it is noncompensable.
(2) Integrity and the Government rely on the
regulations which provide that checking in and out, such
as by punching in and out at a time clock, are ordinarily
noncompensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act. 29 C.F.R.
§§ 785.24,790.8(g). They assert that being searched "is just
the modern equivalent.., of punching the clock." Pet. Br.
26; Gov’t Br. 24. But punching in and out is fundamentally
different from being searched. The considerations that
render clocking in and out noncompensable are not present
in the case of a search for stolen warehouse inventory.
The usual purpose of punching in and out is to collect
information related to compensation, to create a record28 of
28. See U.S. Br. 25: "A requirement to check in and out may
also be driven by the employer’s reasonable desire to have a record
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when a particular employee entered and left the location of
the time clock, usually to provide a basis for determining
how long the employee was on the job and how much
the employee should be paid. A search has none of those
elements. A guard who conducts a search would not usually
make a record of who was searched or when; the facts
set out in the complaint do not suggest any such thing
occurred here. A guard ordinarily would not care which
employee he or she had searched or when. Air travelers
readily distinguish "checking in" at an airport ticket
counter from being searched (or otherwise screened) by
the Transportation Security Agency. Integrity fails to
explain what checking (or punching) out has in common
with being searched, other than that (like the doffing of
safety gear in IBP) they both occur after a worker has
completed his or her shift but before leaving the facility.
The Government argues that in at least some cases
a time clock (or other checking in and out) "could be
characterized as an ’anti-theft measure,’ making it like a
search, because checking in and out would make inaccurate
reporting of hours less likely." U.S. Br. 24. It is possible,
the government notes, that a "supervisor inaccurately
recorded [the worker’s] hours." Id. The government is
hypothesizing an employer which ordinarily relies on
supervisor-created notes about how long each employee
work, but suspects that the supervisor is falsifying those
records to obtain undeserved wages for an employee,
and therefore installs a time clock to double check the
supervisor’s records. It seems exceedingly unlikely that
the framers of the regulation in question had in mind such
for various purposes, of who is on the premises at any given time."
(Emphasis added).
37
a highly atypical case; surely, that is not checking in and
out "under the conditions normally present." 29 C.F.R. §
790.7(g).
The government suggests that checking out might
involve a guard "who checks an employee’s identity"
and notes that the employee is leaving. U.S. Br.23. Such
a quasi-investigatory act by a guard, it argues, would
not be all that different from looking into an employee’s
purse or briefcase. U.S. Br. 24. But while checking out
might occasionally involve giving one’s name to a guard,
or filling out a log sheet maintained by a guard, guards in
such situations do not ordinarily "check[] an employee’s
identity," to make sure the departing individual is the
employee he or she claims to be. In those rare instances
in which a guard might be assigned to confirm the identity
of each departing worker, such as scrutiny of departing
prison guards to make sure that none was an inmate
masquerading as a guard, it seems unlikely that the official
responsible for checking identities would also be asked to
do the work of time clock.
The government appears to suggest that a search is
like (or part of) checking out because it happens when
the worker is leaving, occurs near the door, and does
not take very long; being searched is merely "part of
the process of departing the premises" or "ancillary to
departing the premises." U.S. Br. 24, 25. But neither
the statute nor the regulations deny compensation to
principal activities if they occur while a worker is in
"the process of departing the premises." It is difficult
to reconcile this suggestion with the government’s
acknowledgement that "if employees were required to
complete paperwork about what they had done during
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their shift,.., or obtain assignments for the next shift,
such activities would generally be compensable." U.S. Br.
31-32 n.18. If a worker’s supervisor stood next to the door,
and there received reports or made assignments for the
next day, one might describe those end-of-day activities
as "ancillary to departing the premises," but they would
still be compensable.
Checking out is ordinarily non-compensable because
it is part of the process through which compensation is
calculated and provided to a worker (like picking up a
paycheck), not one of the tasks a worker may be ordered
to do to earn that compensation. The basic arrangement
between employer and employee is that the employee
agrees to engage in activities required by the employer,
in return for which the employer provides the worker with
compensation. The employer benefit to which Tennessee
Coal refers are the benefits from those required services.
The compensation side of this arrangement will often
involve some employee action, such as documenting when
he or she was at work or going to pick up a paycheck, and
in some situations the employer will require the worker to
do that in a particular manner, such as by using a punch
clock. Similarly, an employer might require a worker as
a condition of enrolling in its health care plan to come
to the HR office and fill out a form. But the primary
beneficiary of these compensation-related activities
are to the employee, and the incidental benefits to the
employer--such as the increased administrability of the
compensation scheme--are not the benefits with which
Tennessee Coal is concerned.
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The Standards Proposed By Integrity And The
Government Are Legally Incorrect And Would
Lead To Untenable Results
(1) The Government suggests that an employer only
has to pay for pre- or post-shift activities that are "directly
related" to the work that was done during the paid shift.
Gov’t Br. 11.29 That contention is plainly inconsistent with
footnote 6 in the Government’ brief, which acknowledges
that under the Department’s regulations employee
participation in an employer-required training is
compensable "even if the training did not relate directly"
to the worker’s regular work. U.S. Br. 21 n.6. And it is at
odds with the decision in Dunlop v. City Electric, Inc.,
where the court held, at the behest of the Secretary of
Labor, that employees’ pre-shift activities "performed at
their employer’s behest and for the benefit of the business"
are principal activities. Dunlop v. City Electric, Inc.,
527 F.2d 394, 491 (5th Cir. 1976). "It is . . . irrelevant
whether fueling and unloading trucks is ’directly related’
to the business of [the electricians in question]; what is
important is that such work is necessary to the business
and is performed by the employees for the benefit of the
employer, in the ordinary course of that business." Id.
29. See also, U.S. Br. 8 ("the anti-theft screenings.., were
not closely intertwined with their principal activity of filling orders
in the warehouse"), 10 ("[p]etitioner’s... screenings were not
integral and indispensable to the work performed by its warehouse
employees"), 11 ("An Otherwise "Preliminary" Or "Postliminary"
Activity Must Be Closely Related To An Employee’s Principal
Activities To Be Integral And Indispensible To Them."), 13 ("a
compensable activity is one that bears a close or direct relationship
to an employee’s principal activities.").
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More seriously, such a rule would legalize wholesale
evasion of the FLSA overtime requirements. Employers
could routinely require workers to work off the clock
so long as the required pre- and post-shift activity
was not "closely and directly related" or "integral and
indispensable" to what the employees did during their
shift. At almost every employer there will be tasks that
would fit within this loophole. A warehouse worker could
be required to mow the lawn or wash the boss’s car. A
receptionist could be directed to come in early to make
coffee or tend to the office plants. That result obviously is
not what the FLSA, the Portal-to-Portal Act or the Labor
Department regulations provide.
(2) Integrity advances a somewhat more stringent
version of the government’s proposed "closely related"
standard, insisting that pre- and post-shift work is only
compensable if it is integral and indispensable to the
employee’s "primary" duties.3° A court administering
this standard would apparently review what a worker did
during the (usually forty) hours for which he or she was
being paid, and determine which of those duties were his
or her "primary" or "principal" job tasks.31 The employer
would only have to pay an employee for required post-shift
work that was integral and indispensable to those primary
job duties, and but would not have to pay the employee for
30. "[The proper] inquiry [is] whether the task is integral
and indispensable to an employee’s principal job duties." Pet. Br.
36 (emphasis in original); see Pet. Br. 2 ("primary job duties"), 17
("principal job functions"), 18 ("principal job activities").
31. See 29 C.F.R. § 790.b(a) ("The use by Congress of the
plural form ’activities’ in the statute makes it clear that in order for
an activity to be a ’principal’ activity, it need not be predominate
in some way over all other activities engaged in by the employee
in performing his job .... ").
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post-shift work if the paid task to which it was integral
and indispensable was merely a secondary job duty. For
example, if an employee at a meat packing plant spent 38
hours a week cleaning and packaging carcasses, and only 2
hours a week butchering the animals, the employer would
not have to pay the employee for time spent sharpening
the knives needed for that butchering, because it would not
be integral and indispensable to the worker’s "principal
job function." But see Mitchell v. King Packing Co., 350
U.S. 260 (1956).
(3) Integrity~2 and the Government~ advance another
variant of this standard, asserting that pre- and post-
32. Pet. Br. 16 ("the activity in question must be so integral
and indispensable to the employee’s productive work as to be
counted among the employee’s principal activities.") (emphasis
in original), 19-20 ("What matters is... whether the task is
integral and indispensable to the employee’s productive work.")
(emphasis in original), 22-23 ("An employee’s ’principal activities,’
¯.. include ’work of consequence performed for an employer’ and
activities that are ’indispensable to the performance of productive
work.’ 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(a)"), 36 ("the FLSA will apply only to
activities that are part and parcel of employees’ productive
work."), 39 ("The principal activities for which an employee must
be compensated include ’work of consequence’ performed for the
employer and activities that are ’indispensable to the performance
of productive work.’ 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(a). Here, Respondent’s ’work
of consequence’ and ’productive work’ involved filling customer
orders .... ")(emphasis in original), 39 ("What matters is...
whether the activity.., is ’integral and indispensable[’] to the
employees’ principal productive work.").
33. U.S. Br.8 ("Th[e] screenings were required by the
employer .... But the regulations and this Court’s cases required
that the activity be ’integral and indispensable’ to the employee’s
productive work .... "), 21 ("th[e] screenings do not have a close
connection to the performance of the employees’ productive work
in the warehouse").
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shift activity is compensable under section 254(a) only
if it is integral and indispensable to the employee’s
"productive work." In addition to permitting compulsory
unpaid work that is unrelated to work done during an
employee’s shift, this would also permit compulsory
unpaid work that was integral and indispensable to shift
work if the court concluded that the related shift work
itself was not "productive." Integrity appears to suggest
that participating in the search in this case was not
compensable as such because (on its view) doing so was
not "productive work."
But the FLSA refers without limitation to "work"
and "workweek", not to work or workweeks that are
productive. The regulations classify as compensable
work employer-required activities that would not readily
be characterized as productive work. See Reich v. New
York City Transit Authority, 45 F.3d 646, 650-51 (2d
Cir. 1995). And the term "productive work" is obviously
subjective. In some sense, Integrity must have considered
the searches productive, or it would not have spent the
money to buy metal detectors and pay screeners in the
first place. "Many retail employers use employee security
screenings, including employee bag searches, as a loss
prevention method." Amicus National Retail Federation
("NRF") Br. 4. In any event, interpreting the FLSA to
require overtime pay only for work that is "productive
work," or is integral and indispensable to "productive
work," would lead to intractable problems and disputes.
Unproductive work is a regrettably common
occurrence. Workers waste countless hours every day
attending unproductive meetings, reading and writing
unproductive memos, and discussing unproductive ideas.
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Workers are often required to engage in activities whose
purpose is not to produce anything, but merely to prevent
something from going wrong. If an employee refused to
perform a task assigned by the employer solely because
the employee believed it would be unproductive, the
employee would be fired for insubordination, and rightly
so. Work often is recognized as having been unproductive
only long after it was performed. Congress assuredly did
not intend that a worker’s right to compensation turn on
such distinctions.
(4) Each of the standards proposed by Integrity
would undermine the core purpose of the FLSA overtime
requirement, by permitting an employer in a variety of
circumstances to unpaid require pre- and post-shift work.
Under all of them
[a]n employer could impose significant, time-
consuming duties on the employee to be
performed.., before and after the main body
of the workday.., and be exempted from
payment for those duties because they were not
sufficiently related to the employee’s principal
duties performed during the workday ....
[S]uch an interpretation would exaggerate the
effect of the Portal-to-Portal exemptions, and
would substantially undermine the purposes
of the Fair Labor Standards Act by creating
loopholes capable of significant abuse.
Reich v. New York City Transit Authority, 45 F.3d at
650-51. Indeed, many of these formulations would appear
to permit the abuse that was at the very core of the
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FLSA overtime provision, requiring workers (before or
after their paid shift) to do more of the same work they
perform during the shift. A worker’s ability to engage in
most shift work-filling orders, washing dishes, making
widgets--does not depend on whether he does more of the
same before or after that shift. A warehouse worker would
be able to fill orders between 9 and 5 even if he had not
filled other orders (without pay) from 8 to 9 that morning
or from 5 to 6 the previous afternoon.
III.The Purpose of the FLSA (Untouched By The
Portal-to-Portal Act) Is Not Only To Compensate
Workers For Working More Than 40 Hours In A
Workweek, But Also To Encourage Employers To
Implement Efficiencies And Spread Work In Order
To Reduce Employee Overtime
Although Integrity and amicus NRF complain about
the cost of compliance with the FLSA if search time is
declared compensable, they both understand that the
cost involved would be only the modest expense of making
the search process sufficiently efficient that the search
and related waiting time become de minimis. Integrity
could simply hire additional screeners or stagger the
shift times to eliminate the waiting period that consumes
most of the worker time at issue in this case. Creating an
incentive for such measures is well within the purpose
of the FLSA. The goals of section 7 were not only to
compensate workers if they had to work more than 40
hours in a week, but also to motivate employers to adopt
measures that would shorten the employee’s workweek to
40 hours, such as hiring additional workers rather than
burden their existing workforce.
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By this requirement [of compensation for
overtime at one and one-half times the normal
hourly rate], although overtime was not flatly
prohibited, financial pressure was applied to
spread employment to avoid the extra wage
and workers were assured additional pay to
compensate them for the burden of a workweek
beyond the hours fixed in the act. In a period
of widespread unemployment and small profits,
the economy inherent in avoiding extra pay
was expected to have an appreciable effect in
the distribution of available work. Reduction of
hours was a part of the plan from the beginning.
"A fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work" was the
objective stated in the Presidential message
which initiated the legislation. That message
referred to a ’general maximum working week’,
"longer hours on the payment of time and a half
for overtime" and the evil of "overwork" as well
as "underpay." The message of November 15,
1937, calling for the enactment of this type of
legislation referred again to protection from
excessive hours. [The] Senate Report..., the
companion House Report and the Conference
report all spoke of maximum hours as a
separately desirable object.
Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572,
577-78 (1942) (internal footnotes omitted). The passage
of the Portal-to-Portal Act did not change that legislative
purpose. See 29 C.F.R. § 790.2. Bay Ridge Operating Co.
v. Aaron, reiterated that the purpose of section 7 "was to
compensate those who labored in excess of the statutory
maximum number of hours for the wear and tear of
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extra work and to spread employment through inducing
employers to shorten hours because of the pressure of
extra cost .... " Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334
U.S. 446, 460 (1948). But if, as Integrity maintains, the
search and related waiting times are noncompensable,
Integrity can skimp on hiring more screeners, deploying
more metal detectors and using other line-shortening and
time-saving devices or techniques, and instead waste as
much of the workers’ time as it pleases.
IV. The Court Should Not Adopt A Per Se Rule
Regarding Whether "Security Screening" Is Work
Under The FLSA Or A Principal Activity Under The
Portal-to-Portal Act
Integrity urged this Court to grant review in this case
to adopt a "uniform rule" regarding the compensability
of "security screenings." Pet. Br. 42. But the definition of
work under the FLSA and the contours of the exclusions
in section 254(a) are too complex to permit a per se rule in
this area, and the practices that might be characterized
as "security screenings "take a variety of forms... [a]
nd serve a variety of purposes." Pet. Br. 43; see 29 C.F.R.
§ 790.7(b) ("Activities which under one set of circumstances
may be ’preliminary’ or ’postliminary’ activities, may
under other conditions be ’principal’ activities.").
The phrase "security screening" is not part of the
text of the FLSA, the Portal-to-Portal Act, or any of the
regulations interpreting those statutes. It is far from
clear what types of practices would be encompassed by
a per se rule regarding "security screenings." The term
"security" suggests that the purpose of such a practice
would be to stop some deliberately harmful or otherwise
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illegal action, such as by preventing a dangerous person
(a terrorist or thief) or object (a gun or a bomb) from
entering a building, or preventing the forbidden departure
of something (a dangerous substance) or someone (an
inmate). But a person might be scrutinized on entry to
avoid an unintended accident (excluding matches from
a munitions factory) or on departure to determine if
an accident had occurred (monitoring for radioactive
contamination of the clothes of a nuclear plant worker).
Upon entering the work site, workers might be checked to
ensure that they had not inadvertently forgotten to bring
something to work, or upon leaving, to confirm they were
not inadvertently taking something home (e.g., the keys to
a company truck). Access to a building might be limited
merely to avoid gawking tourists in the hall, or to prevent
non-customers from using the restrooms. These purposes
might or might not be described as involving security. If
an employer adopted a practice for several reasons, a court
would have to decide how to resolve a mixed motive case.
It is also unclear what action would constitute a
"screening." "Screening" suggests a relatively brief and
unintrusive process of scrutiny which a person must
complete before being permitted to enter or leave a
building. But what if a departing worker were required to
submit to a search of the contents of his or her locker, car,
or cell phone, or to take a polygraph test regarding whether
he or she had stolen anything? A pharmaceutical company
concerned that workers were using narcotics available in
a plant might order employees, prior to leaving, to submit
a blood or urine sample. In the wake of the theft of a
valuable item from a particular department, each worker
in that unit might be subjected at the end of his or her shift
to a detailed and aggressive interrogation by company
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officials. Not all of those practices would necessarily be
described as mere "screening"; at some point "screening"
becomes a euphemism for an investigation.
Furthermore, the sort of per se rule urged by
Integrity is not necessary to avoid calling into question
most typical security practices. In many circumstances,
overtime claims related to ordinary security screenings
will be precluded by the de minimis doctrine. If a worker
punches out on a time clock and is able to promptly walk
through a metal detector and out the door, the screening
itself would take only a moment, and would not give rise to
a colorable claim under the FLSA. Integrity dismisses the
idea of a de minimis exception to FLSA claims as "barely
adumbrated" Pet. Br. 35-36 n.8, as if this were some novel
and inchoate legal concoction. To the contrary, "the roots
of the de minimis doctrine stretch to ancient soil, [and]
its application in the.., context [of the FLSA] began
with [the 1944] decision in [Mt.Clemens]." Sandifer v. US
Steel, 134 S.Ct. at 880.34 The de minimis doctrine has for
34. Mt. Clemens, 328 U.S. at 692:
The workweek contemplated by s 7(a) must be
computed in light of the realities of the industrial
world. When the matter in issue concerns only a few
seconds or minutes of work beyond the scheduled
working hours, such trifles may be disregarded. Split-
second absurdities are not justified by the actualities of
working conditions or by the policy of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. It is only when an employee is required
to give up a substantial measure of his time and effort
that compensable working time is involved. The de
minimis rule can doubtless be applied to much of the
walking time involved in this case, but the precise
scope of that application can be determined only after
the trier of facts makes more definite findings as to
the amount of walking time in issue.
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decades been an established part of FLSAjurisprudence.
See 29 C.F.R. § 785.47; 1 Ellen Kearns, ed., The Fair Labor
Standards Act (2d ed. 2010), 8-81 to 8-93 (citing cases).
In a number of cases, employers have asserted the de
minimis doctrine as a defense to an overtime claim based
on a security screening.3~
Many security screenings also fall outside the FLSA
because they are directed at the public as a whole, not at
employees. In the common situation in which everyone
entering a government building, including members of
the general public, is required to go through a metal
detector, that requirement could not fairly be described
as an obligation imposed by the government agency on
its employees. This is, rather, a requirement imposed on
everyone by the agency acting as the proprietor of the
premises, not acting as an employer, which incidentally
affects employees only because they are being treated like
everyone else.36 If a TSA worker going on vacation had to
pass through security at an airport, no one would say that
the vacationer had been required to do so by his or her
employer, even though TSA is operating that screening
system. In that type of circumstance, participating in a
search would not be work within the scope of Tennessee
Coal or the FLSA.
35. E.g., Alvarado v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2008 WL
2477393 at *3-84 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2008); Whalen v. United
States, 93 Fed.C1. 579, 601 n.26 (Fed. C1. 2010).
36. An employer could not "evade its FLSA obligations
by allowing an occasional visitor on the premises, subject to a
requirement that almost always applies to employees only." U.S.
Br. 30.
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In many instances, security screening is either
directed at everyone entering the premises, or is actually
intended for non-employees, with employees being affected
only incidentally. Employees may be given special passes
(or use of separate entrances) as a convenience to permit
them to avoid the more rigorous and time-consuming
screening practices imposed on members of the general
public; screening at the employee entrance may be limited
to steps needed to assure that members of the public are
not using that particular door. Bonilla v. Baker Concrete
Construction, Inc., 487 F.3d 1340, 1345 (11th Cir. 2007)
(employee access card system used to prevent members of
the public from accessing airport tarmac.). In many cases
involving security screenings by the government, the
screening at issue was directed at the public at large. See
Pet. Br. at 31, 37; see also, Ceja-Corona v. CVS Pharmacy,
Inc., 2013 WL 3282974 (E.D. Cal. July 2, 2013) (discussing
the differences between the security screenings in this
case and those in Gorman v. Consolidated Edison and
Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Services, Inc. in light of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in Busk v. Integrity
Staffing Solutions, Inc.).
In some instances a search would not be a job
requirement at all. An employer could, for example, prohibit
employees from bringing bags to work; it might instead,
as a convenience to the workers, permit bags, but only
provided that workers who do bring bags will be subject
to a bag search on the way out. In that circumstance the
search would be not a job requirement, but a condition of
an employer-afforded convenience; a worker would be free
to avoid the search simply by choosing not to bring a big
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to the plant or office. 37 That would be analogous to a plant
at which the employer for the convenience of employees
provided (but did not require use of) work clothes, on the
condition that at the end of the day a worker could not
leave his or her dirty work clothes on the changing room
floor, but would have to return them to a laundry room.
But in the search in this case was not merely the condition
appurtenant to such an employer-afforded convenience; it
was a job requirement.
CONCLUSION
This action was occasioned by an uncommon problem,
a post-shift search process conducted so inefficiently that
employees at Amazon.corn warehouses allegedly waited
25 minutes each day before they could leave the building
where they worked. None of the amici supporting Integrity
asserts that it, or even a single one of its members, engages
in a similar practice. Integrity does not contend that
such time consuming searches are or ever were standard
practice at the nation’s plants and offices. No one suggests
that warehouses and stores could not survive if they had
to avoid this sort of delay. Wasting worker time in under-
staffed post-shift searches is not essential to the financial
viability of Amazon.corn or any other employer; it is just
a little bit cheaper.
37. See Frlekin v. Apple, Inc., 2014 WL 2451598 at *4
(N.D.Cal. May 30, 2014); Alvarado v. Costco Wholesale, 2008 WL
2477393 at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2008). Workers who did not bring
bags should be allowed to use a separate line so that they do not
have to wait for the bag check of others.
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Integrity reports that the decision below has spawned
13 nationwide class-action3s lawsuits against Amazon.corn
and its staffing companies. Pet. Br. 46-47. But that pattern
reflects only different plaintiffs and lawyers attempting to
bring the same basic lawsuit on behalf of the same workers
against the same company and its affiliates. Integrity
notes with alarm that in litigation against Amazon.corn
and its staffing companies "the putative class includes
more than 400,000 plaintiffs." Pet. Br. 47. But Congress
did not choose to exempt the nation’s largest companies
from the obligations imposed on smaller employers by
the Fair Labor Standards Act. And Congress did not
provide that employers which deny legally required
overtime payments to many thousands of workers should
be entitled on that account to greater solicitude than would
be accorded to employers which violate the rights of only
a handful of victims.
Integrity suggests that a requirement that employees
work several hours a week without pay is merely among
that "factors that employees must weigh and consider in
choosing whether to take a particular job." Pet. Br. 45.
Top ranked graduates of the nation’s most prestigious
law schools may have the luxury of "weigh[ing]" and
"consider[ing]" such "factors" in choosing whether to
take a particular job. But tens of millions of less fortunate
workers have to take any job they can get. The Fair
Labor Standards Act was intended to protect the working
conditions of those who lack the bargaining power in the
labor market to protect themselves.
38. An FLSA lawsuit seeking relief for a large number of
employees is a collective action, not a class action. If any of the
lawsuits referred to by Integrity are class actions, the class claim
would be based on state law.
53
For the above reasons, the judgment of the court of
appeals should be affirmed.
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APPENDIX
REGULATIONS INVOLVED
1.29 C.ER. §785.7 provides:
Judicial Construction. The United States Supreme
Court originally stated that employees subject to
the act must be paid for all time spent in "physical
or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not)
controlled or required by the employer and pursued
necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the
employer and his business." (Tennessee Coal, Iron
& Railroad Co. v.Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U. S.
590 (1944)) Subsequently, the Court ruled that there
need be no exertion at all and that all hours are hours
worked which the employee is required to give his
employer, that "an employer, if he chooses, may hire
a man to do nothing, or to do nothing but wait for
something to happen. Refraining from other activity
often is a factor of instant readiness to serve, and
idleness plays a part in all employments in a stand-by
capacity. Readiness to serve may be hired, quite as
much as service itself, and time spent lying in wait
for threats to the safety of the employer’s property
may be treated by the parties as a benefit to the
employer." (Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126
(1944); Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944)) The
workweek ordinarily includes "all the time during
which an employee is necessarily required to be on the
employer’s premises, on duty or at a prescribed work
place". (Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.,328 U.S.
680 (1946)) The Portal-to-Portal Act did not change
the rule except to provide an exception for preliminary
and postliminary activities. See § 785.34.
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2.29 C.F.R. § 785.16(a) provides:
Off Duty. (a) General. Periods during which an
employee is completely relieved from duty and
which are long enough to enable him to use the time
effectively for his own purposes are not hours worked.
He is not completely relieved from duty and cannot
use the time effectively for his own purposes unless
he is definitely told in advance that he may leave the
job and that he will not have to commence work until
a definitely specified hour has arrived. Whether the
time is long enough to enable him to use the time
effectively for his own purposes depends upon all of
the facts and circumstances of the case.
(b) Truck drivers; specific examples. A truck driver
who has to wait at or near the job site for goods to be
loaded is working during the loading period. If the
driver reaches his destination and while awaiting the
return trip is required to take care of his employer’s
property, he is also working while waiting. In both
cases the employee is engaged to wait. Waiting is
an integral part of the job. On the other hand, for
example, if the truck driver is sent from Washingtion,
DC to New York City, leaving at 6 a.m. and arriving
at 12 noon, and is completely and specifically relieved
from all duty until 6 p.m. when he again goes on duty
for the return trip the idle time is not working time.
He is waiting to be engaged. (Skidmore v. Swift, 323
U.S. 134, 137 (1944); Walling v. Dunbar Transfer
& Storage, 3 W.H. Cases 284; 7 Labor Cases para.
61,565 (W.D. Tenn. 1943); Giffordv. Chapman, 6 W.H.
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Cases 806; 12 Labor Cases para. 63,661 (W.D. Okla.,
1947); Thompson v. Daugherty, 40 Supp. 279 (D. Md.
1941))
3.29 C.F.R. § 785.19 provides:
Meal. (a) Bona fide meal periods. Bona fide meal
periods are not worktime. Bona fide meal periods do
not include coffee breaks or time for snacks. These
are rest periods. The employee must be completely
relieved from duty for the purposes of eating regular
meals. Ordinarily 30 minutes or more is long enough
for a bona fide meal period. A shorter period may be
long enough under special conditions. The employee
is not relieved if he is required to perform any duties,
whether active or inactive, while eating. For example,
an office employee who is required to eat at his desk
or a factory worker who is required to be at his
machine is working while eating. (Culkin v. Glenn
L. Martin, Nebraska Co., 97 F. Supp. 661 (D.
Neb. 1951), aff’d 197 F. 2d 981 (C.A. 8, 1952), cert.
denied 344 U.S. 888 (1952); Thompson v. Stock &
Sons, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 213 (E.D. Mich 1950), aff’d
194 F. 2d 493 (C.A. 6, 1952); Biggs v. Joshua Hendy
Corp.,183 F. 2d 515 (C. A. 9, 1950), 187 F. 2d 447 (C.A.
9, 1951); Walling v. Dunbar Transfer & Storage Co., 3
W.H. Cases 284; 7 Labor Cases para. 61.565 (W.D.
Tenn. 1943); Lofton v. Seneca Coal and Coke Co., 2
W.H. Cases 669; 6 Labor Cases para. 61,271 (N.D.
Okla. 1942); aff’d 136 F. 2d 359 (C.A. 10, 1943); cert.
denied 320 U.S. 772 (1943); Mitchell v. Tampa Cigar
Co.,36 Labor Cases para. 65, 198, 14 W.H. Cases 38
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(S.D. Fla. 1959); Douglass v. Hurwitz Co.,145 F. Supp.
29, 13 W.H. Cases (E.D. Pa. 1956))
(b) Where no permission to leave premises. It is not
necessary that an employee be permitted to leave
the premises if he is otherwise completely freed from
duties during the meal period.
4.29 C.F.R. § 785.23 provides:
Employees residing on employer’s premises or
working at home. An employee who resides on his
employer’s premises on a permanent basis or for
extended periods of time is not considered as working
all the time he is on the premises. Ordinarily, he may
engage in normal private pursuits and thus have
enough time for eating, sleeping, entertaining, and
other periods of complete freedom from all duties
when he may leave the premises for purposes of his
own. It is, of course, difficult to determine the exact
hours worked under these circumstances and any
reasonable agreement of the parties which takes
into consideration all of the pertinent facts will be
accepted. This rule would apply, for example, to the
pumper of a stripper well who resides on the premises
of his employer and also to a telephone operator who
has the switchboard in her own home. (Skelly Oil
Co. v. Jackson, 194 Okla. 183, 148 P. 2d 182 (Okla. Sup.
Ct. 1944; Thompson v. Loring Oil Co., 50 F. Supp. 213
(W.D. La. 1943).)
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5. 29 C.F.R. § 785.26 provides:
Section 3(0) of the Fair Labor Standard Act Section
3(0) of the Act provides an exception to the general
rule for employees under collective bargaining
agreements. This section provides for the exclusion
from hours worked of time spent by an employee in
changing clothes or washing at the beginning or end
of each workday which was excluded from measured
working time during the week involved by the express
terms of or by custom or practice under a bona fide
collective-bargaining agreement applicable to the
particular employee. During any week in which
such clothes-changing or washing time was not so
excluded, it must be counted as hours worked if the
changing of clothes or washing is indispensable to the
performance of the employee’s work or is required by
law or by the rules of the employer. The same would
be true if the changing of clothes or washing was a
preliminary or postliminary activity compensable by
contract, custom, or practice as provided by section
4 of the Portal-to-Portal Act, and as discussed in
§ 785.9 and part 790 of this chapter.
6.29 C.F.R. § 785.27 provides:
General Attendance at lectures, meetings, training
programs and similar activities need not be counted
as working time if the following four criteria are met:
(a) Attendance is outside of the employee’s regular
working hours;
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(b) Attendance is in fact voluntary;
(c) The course, lecture, or meeting is not directly
related to the employee’s job; and
(d) The employee does not perform any productive
work during such attendance.
7. 29 C.F.R. § 785.28 provides:
Involuntary attendance. Attendance is not voluntary,
of course, if it is required by the employer. It is not
voluntary in fact if the employee is given to understand
or led to believe that his present working conditions or
the continuance of his employment would be adversely
affected by nonattendance.
8.29 C.F.R. § 785.29 provides:
Training directly related to employee’s job. The
training is directly related to the employee’s job if
it is designed to make the employee handle his job
more effectively as distinguished from training him
for another job, or to a new or additional skill. For
example, a stenographer who is given a course in
stenography is engaged in an activity to make her
a better stenographer. Time spent in such a course
given by the employer or under his auspices is hours
worked. However, if the stenographer takes a course
in bookkeeping, it may not be directly related to her
job. Thus, the time she spends voluntarily in taking
such a bookkeeping course, outside of regular working
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hours, need not be counted as working time. Where a
training course is instituted for the bona fide purpose
of preparing for advancement through upgrading
the employee to a higher skill, and is not intended to
make the employee more efficient in his present job,
the training is not considered directly related to the
employee’s job even though the course incidentally
improves his skill in doing his regular work.
9. 29 C.F.R. § 785.30 provides:
Independent training Of course, if an employee on his
own initiative attends an independent school, college
or independent trade school after hours, the time is
not hours worked for his employer even if the courses
are related to his job.
10. 29 C.F.R. § 785.31 provides:
Special situations. There are some special situations
where the time spent in attending lectures, training
sessions and courses of instruction is not regarded
as hours worked. For example, an employer may
establish for the benefit of his employees a program
of instruction which corresponds to courses offered
by independent bona fide institutions of learning.
Voluntary attendance by an employee at such courses
outside of working hours would not be hours worked
even if they are directly related to his job, or paid for
by the employer.
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11.29 C.F.R. § 785.43 provides:
Medical Attention. Time spent by an employee in
waiting for and receiving medical attention on the
premises or at the direction of the employer during
the employee’s normal working hours on days when
he is working constitutes hours worked.
12.29 C.F.R. § 785.44 provides:
Civic and charitable work. Time spent in work
for public or charitable purposes at the employer’s
request, or under his direction or control, or while
the employee is required to be on the premises, is
working time. However, time spent voluntarily in such
activities outside of the employee’s normal working
hours is not hours worked.
13.29 C.F.R. § 785.45 provides:
Suggestion systems. Generally, time spent by
employees outside of their regular working hours in
developing suggestions under a general suggestion
system is not working time, but if employees are
permitted to work on suggestions during regular
working hours the time spent must be counter as
hours worked. Where an employee is assigned to
work on the development of a suggestion, the time is
considered time worked.
